The Haka Uprising
THE HAKA UPRISING
“While no organised attack was made during the whole of our twenty-two days inside the Police Lines* we knew perfectly well that they could wipe us off the face of the earth at any moment if they had the courage to boldly close in on us and make the attempt”,[1] wrote Laura Hardin Carson in her first hand account of Chin uprising in 1917. It reveals the nature and magnitude of an indigenous response to colonial administration. This article is an attempt to mainly discuss the causes and extent of the Haka uprising. It tries to delve deep into the factors behind the non-participation of the entire Chin tribes while Haka was embroiled in political turmoil.
The annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 brought the British into direct contact with the Chins on that frontier. The anarchy in the Kabaw-Kale valley in the aftermath of the annexation provided a congenial soil to the Chins to carry out raids on a more regular basis with the assistance of rebels who found safe haven in the Chin country. This brought the British and the Chins at loggerheads. Series of military encounters took place between the British and the Chins during the late 1880s and early 1890s which resulted to the subjugation of the latter. In 1896, the Chin Hills Regulation was adopted which marked the formal establishment of British administration in Chin Hills.
The early years of British administration saw a marked improvement in infrastructures and all aspects of live. Roads and bridges were made and communications improved, markets established at strategic locations while education introduced by Christian missionaries enlightened the people. The power and functions of the chiefs and headmen had been redefined by the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896. Villages were regrouped. Inter-village and intra-village raids almost disappeared and the practice of slave-raiding was checked heavily. Though the British had gained the loyalty of some Chin Chiefs not all chiefs or headmen had reconciled themselves to British rule. Moreover, they looked suspiciously upon the progress of Christianity, the very reason for the popularity of Pau Cin Hau movement or Laipianism.
At the outbreak of the Great War there was a call for men from the hill areas of Assam and Burma for the Labour Corps in France. One thousand men each were to be supplied from the three subdivisions of Haka, Falam and Tedim. Hau Cin Khup, the Kamhau Chief, who had always been loyal to the British since the Sukte-Sihzang rebellion gave invaluable service by collecting more than a thousand from Tedim subdivision. He was assisted by chiefs Pau Za Cin, Dong Tual and Pau Khaw Mang in raising the Chin Labour Corps. The Superintendent of the Chin Hills had happily noted: “This response by the Northern Chin is more remarkable when it is considered that there are only about 5,000 males between the ages of 20 and 40 in the subdivision.”[2] In Falam subdivision over 800 labourers had been enrolled. There was minor resistance from the Khuangli village, which spread to a certain number of villages in the Zahau tract. But this was soon overcome.[3] Several Chin chiefs had also shown their loyalty to the British by making donations to the War Relief Fund. Among these Zahau Chief Van Nul and Falam Chief Van Hmon donated Rs.1000 and Rs.744 each.[4]
The situation in Haka subdivision was different. Laura Carson thus describes what it was:
word came that the Government was going to attempt to raise “a coolie corps” from among our people, for service in France. This caused great excitement. One corps had already been raised among the Siyins in Tiddim and efforts were being made to raise another in the Falam subdivision. Haka would be next! All military British officers and sepoys who could be spared had been withdrawn from the Hills and had gone to France. Civil officers were sent to lower Burma for military training. Haka was therefore left without a British officer and with only a handful of sepoys, most of whom were more boys, no one dreaming that the Haka Chins would make any serious trouble. But there was an undercurrent of tense excitement. One could feel it in the air. There were only three English-speaking people in Haka at the time, two Anglo-Indian men and myself. There was a rumor of trouble and attempted revolt in Falam and our Haka civil officer was hastily recalled from lower Burma, and the sepoy guard for Haka was increased from twenty-six to fifty men.[5]
In 1917, B Fisher, the Assistant Superintendent of Haka, met various chiefs of Haka subdivision and told them of the number of men each had to supply in proportion to the number of villages they held. It was this demand that was officially cited as the cause of the outbreak. Laura Carson who had over the years established a close rapport with the Haka people received the earliest intelligence of impending trouble on the evening of November 1917 from a Christian convert named Shia Kaw:
thirteen village had united, taking the sacred oath that they would attack Haka, kill the sepoys, take their guns and with them clear the Hills of the British and resume their own government…the men of Sakta had secreted their women and children in the jungle and carried out six months’ provision for them, and they were spending their time day and night making ammunition, and wait for an opportunity to strike. [6]
The Assistant Superintendent who had the matter investigated found Laura Carson’s fears unfounded. Two days later, however, Tsan Dwe, a Christian young man who belonged to an important chief’s family, brought another warning that “his brother had seen a large force congregated that evening only about three miles from Haka”. Another investigation was conducted by the Assistant Superintendent which proved that whatever Shia Kaw said turned out to be true. On the morning of 23 November 1917, after he received another report of an advancing army of 5,000 strong towards Haka, Fischer ordered all his men to take shelter in the “Police Lines”.[7] This was reported to the Superintendent of Falam who urgently wired Shillong for assistance.[8] The petty officials and the Mission workers including Laura Hardin were ordered to take shelter in the Police Lines where they remained for the next twenty-two days.
The next morning a reconnoitering party of fifteen mounted sepoys was ambushed near the station. Sporadic firing was heard though from a distance. The following day Chins were seen rushing into the compound and there was a sharp exchange of firing in which the sergeant’s wife and his daughter were killed.
The Falam-Haka road was cut off, huge trees had been felled across the road on the mountainsides, entanglements had been made out of the telegraph wire and stockades had been raised from the materials taken from Pioneer Camp buildings. On 12 December the Assistant Superintendent managed to clear the road for about twelve miles after thirteen hours of hard work, to enable a Relief Column from Kalewa.[9]
Meanwhile sporadic fighting had been going on at Zokhua, Khuapi, Aitung, Surkhua, Hnaring, and Sakta. On 16 December a 350 well armed Relief Column under the command of Major L E L Burne and four other British officers, and accompanied by the Superintendent at Falam, reached Haka. Contingents from the Assam Rifles sent from Aizawl and Kohima had also arrived in and in collaboration with two Burma columns mounted operations against the principal villages of Kapi, Aiton, Surkhua, Naring, Sakta and suffering in the process many casualties, thirty to forty in number.[10] Units from the Assam Rifles also began operations against villages northeast of Tao range, meeting stiff resistance from Buankhua, Buanlun and Thantlang. In February 1918 a combined Assam Rifles and Burma Military Police detachment moved to Lennakot (Sialmong) in the Northern Chin hills and then to southern Manipur where the Thados also rose up against recruitment for the Labour Corps.[11] The uprising had even spread to Zonghing in Mindat in the Pakokku Hill Tract and to the southern Lushai Hills, covering the upper Boinu and to Wantu, Laitet and Ngaphai resulting in extensive operations.[12]
In early 1919 the uprising was suppressed and leaders were brought to trial. Sixty-one were sentenced.[13] Two Haka Faron men Za Nawl and Hreng Ol were sentenced to death for killing Tum Hngel and her step-daughter Sui Zing, and Ral Chum of Hniarlawn for murdering Asing, a Chinese caretaker at the Pioneer Camp bungalow. The first two hanged themselves in the Haka lockup before the sentence could be carried out.[14] The other leaders were imprisoned in Haka, Falam, Tedim, and Mingyan jails. Fourteen chiefs and others who were serving out their sentences in the Myingyan Jail were later deported to Taungyi and Lashio. Fines amounting to over Rs. 13,000 were levied on the villages participated in the uprising while punitive labour was imposed on some, to construct roads and an artificial lake near Haka, in lieu of imprisonment.[15]
Colonel Leslie Shakespear, the Deputy Inspector General of the Assam Rifles, who was involved in the punitive measures against the Thados in Manipur said that situation in the Chin hills was aggravated by attempts to check slavery, and led to the uprising. The Missionary Robert G Johnson gave a different version:
The causes of rebellion were resentment on the part of the non-Christian Chins against the British occupation of their territory, the perceived loss of power on the part of the Chiefs, and the strange new laws and customs that were moulding society in ways alarming to them. The immediate occasion was the formation of Chin coolie corps to go to France and the reduction of British military forces from Burma.[16]
Such contentions however do not explain why the uprising was confined to the Haka subdivision, and did not involve the Taisun, Sukte, Kamhau, Sihzang, and others who were similarly circumstanced. In fact the first ripples of the disturbances in Manipur in 1915 had been immediately felt in the Tedim area, but it was the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup, who kept “a firm hand on his youngmen”. Likewise, in the Falam subdivision the Taisun Chiefs Van Hmun, the Zahau Chief Van Nul and his son Thang Tin Lian were all loyal to the British: Their contribution to the War Fund and assistance in obtaining labour recruits has already been mentioned. The Superintendent had in fact recorded in his annual Administration Report that:
At the outbreak of the Haka trouble various offers of assistance were given by the Chiefs of Falam and Tiddim Subdivisions. Notably the Yahows under Tantin Lyen offered to send a band of 50 men with guns to operate with the Military Police whenever required.
Van Hmon the Falam Chief undertook the guarding of the Falam suspension bridge at a time when sepoys could not be spared for his duty. And the Laiyo tribe rendered great help by patrolling the line of the Pao river.[17]
Both the Tedim and Falam subdivisions had been under the influence of powerful Chiefs. In Tedim area the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup, who had been so loyal to the Government,[18] exerted remarkable influence on other subordinate chiefs. This was not the case in the Haka subdivision, for here some of the more influential chief had only recently been alienated. In 1915 there was widespread damage to troops by rodents and caterpillars in Haka and Falam. The damage was particularly severe in Haka, where three hundred and forty thousand rats were ultimately killed by the people. Shortage of food, and even starvation was reported from here, and that year the usual supply of foodgrain to the Military Police, which earned the Haka Chins considerable profits, became well nigh impossible. A consequence of this was that the chiefs could not pay their dues to the Government and in the following year they forfeited their commission. It was at this stage that orders came for the supply of men for the Labour Corps. Laura Carson thus records the reaction of the chiefs to the order:
The Government orders were that no coercion was to be used; but the chief did not understand that. An order to bring in the men meant that they must bring them. Chief after chief came to me and asked what he should do. They said that their people absolutely refused to go to France; that they said they had no quarrel with Germany and why should they go and fight the Germans? They said they would commit suicide rather than go.[19]
Undoubtedly the recruitment for the Labour Corps and reduction of British troops and officials from the hills which left the entire Chin hills insufficiently guarded were strong inducements.[20]
The months immediately following the suppression of the uprising were full of hardships for the Haka people. In the operations several villages had been burned with large quantities of grain. Punitive labour took the men away from the villages and the result was a terrible shortage of food, and almost famine conditions prevailed. “One of the leading chiefs told me”, Carson wrote, “that for two months he had not had any food whatever except ‘banhtaw’ which is the boiled sprouts of the banana tree. He said there were thousands in the same condition”.[21]
One of the most important reasons for the suppression of the uprising was the non-participation of the northern Chins who showed loyalty to the British. Had the entire Chin tribes fought in unison it would probably have had a different result? Contrary, the fighting was confined to Haka and its adjoining villages which gave the British army ample space to suppress it. Nevertheless, the causes and nature of the revolt undoubtedly revealed that it was an outburst of anger and a culmination of discontentment against the British administration. Thus it would not be wrong to say that the common cause of the Chin people had found its expression in the Haka uprising.
*It was one of the few Government buildings with a trench around it where sepoys were placed with guns. The best building in the Lines was the station Hospital- a brick building with a small office room, a tiny medicine room and two-fair-sized wards.
[1] Laura Hardin Carson, Pioneer Trails, Trials and Triumphs, Calcutta 1927, Reprint Aizawl 1997, p.233
[2] J W Wright, Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1916-17
[3] Ibid, 1917-18
[4] Ibid, for the year ended 30 June 1915
[5] Laura Carson, op.cit. p.226
[6] Ibid, pp.227-228 The next afternoon Shia Kaw came in again saying that forces were collecting again, both north and south of us, and that Haka was to be attacked within the next three or four days. I told him that the Assistant Superintendent said he had investigated and found conditions in Sakta normal; that women and children had not been taken way; that the people were loyal and that at least ninety were ready to go to France, and that there would be no insurrection. He was greatly excited and distressed and begged us to heed the warning which he had risked his life to bring. That night the Christians asked permission to sleep in the Mission Hospital and Mr. Cope and the teachers patrolled the Mission property all night- but there was not disturbance.
[7] Ibid pp.227-230
[8] Colonel L W Shakespear Assam Rifles, Calcutta 1929, p.212; In early December 1917 the D I G Assam Rifles received a wire from the Superintendent Chin Hills inquiring if he had any knowledge of likely trouble on the Chin Lushai border. The reply stated he had no such knowledge, the only minor trouble known of concerned Zongling in the Unadministered Area towards Arakan. Twelve hours later came an urgent wire to Shillong from Falam, the headquarters station in the Chin hills, saying the southern Chins had risen, Haka station was surrounded, and begging for urgent assistance. Permission to act having been obtained, D I G sent orders to Captain Falkland, Commandant 1st A R at Aijal, to march at once with 150 rifles for Haka, and in a few hours they were en route to cover the 16 marches as rapidly as possible. A few days later another urgent wire from Falam called for more help, and as active trouble had not as yet started in Manipur, Captain Montifore with 150 rifles of the 3rd A R at Kohima was ordered to the Chin hills, traveling as expeditiously as possible- by rail to Chittagong, river steamer to Rangamatti, country boats to Demagiri, whence onwards a fortnight’s hard marching to Haka.
[9] Robert G Johnson, History of the American Baptist Mission, Vol. 1, Valley Forge, USA, 1988, p.416
[10] B Fischer the Superintendent of Pakokku Hill Tracts reported that on 16 April 1918 a party consisting of Captain Alexander Assistant Commandant, a small escort and himself visited a group of villages known as Chan-im in order to calm the people who were very restless. They were attacked by the Chins killing one Miitary Police Havildar and wounding Alexander and two others.
[11] For details on the Kuki uprising in Manipur see L W Shakespear, op.cit. pp.209-232; Gautam Bhadra “The Kuki (?) Uprising (1917-11919): Its causes and nature”, Man in India Vol 55 No.1-4 (January-March) 1975, pp.11-56; Khaikhotinthang Kipgen, Thado War (1917019) Kuki (?) Rebellion, published by the author, Imphal 1976.
[12] For an account of the “Kuki Punitive measures”, in Manipur, L W Shakespear, op.cit. p.228; Robert Reid, op.cit.pp.79-89
[13] Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1918-1919; Some of the most important Haka chiefs responsible for the trouble and sentenced under section 121 of the Indian Penal Code were: Lyen Mo son of Za Err, Van Mang son of Lyen Mo, Kin Hmon son of Lyen Mo, Tyer Non wife of Van Mang, Kup Hmin son of Lwe Sang, Tat Hmon son of Ya Klwe, Ni Kwel son of Kuk Hre, Tan Hnyer son of Lyen Kwe
[14] Ibid, 1919-1920
[15] Johnson, pp.423-424 also see Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1919-1920
[16] Ibid, pp.409-410
[17] J M Wright Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1917-18
[18] Chief Hau Cin Khup had won the following awards for his loyalty to the British: Silvermounted Da and a Certificate of Honour in 1901; K S M in 1917; a gun and a Certificate of Honour in 1918; a revolver and a Certificate of Honour in 1919. See Acts and Achievements of Hau Cin Khup, Chief of Kamhau Clan, Chin Hills, Tedim, Mandalay, Burma 1927.
[19] Laura Carson op.cit. p. 227
[20] E O Fowler commanded the 61st and 62nd Chin Labour Corps from the Tedim Subdivision to France. Altogether there were 1033 Chins from Tedim Subdivision consisting of 250 from Sukte tract, 700 from Kamhau tract and 83 from Sihzang tract. They left Tedim on 27 May 1917 and returned to the Chin Hills in the middle of 1918 with fifty-six casualties. The Labour Corps from Falam composed a part of the 78th Labour Company. They were accompanied by the young Lomban Chief Hlurr Hmung.
[21] Laura Carson, Ibid, p.238
“While no organised attack was made during the whole of our twenty-two days inside the Police Lines* we knew perfectly well that they could wipe us off the face of the earth at any moment if they had the courage to boldly close in on us and make the attempt”,[1] wrote Laura Hardin Carson in her first hand account of Chin uprising in 1917. It reveals the nature and magnitude of an indigenous response to colonial administration. This article is an attempt to mainly discuss the causes and extent of the Haka uprising. It tries to delve deep into the factors behind the non-participation of the entire Chin tribes while Haka was embroiled in political turmoil.
The annexation of Upper Burma in 1886 brought the British into direct contact with the Chins on that frontier. The anarchy in the Kabaw-Kale valley in the aftermath of the annexation provided a congenial soil to the Chins to carry out raids on a more regular basis with the assistance of rebels who found safe haven in the Chin country. This brought the British and the Chins at loggerheads. Series of military encounters took place between the British and the Chins during the late 1880s and early 1890s which resulted to the subjugation of the latter. In 1896, the Chin Hills Regulation was adopted which marked the formal establishment of British administration in Chin Hills.
The early years of British administration saw a marked improvement in infrastructures and all aspects of live. Roads and bridges were made and communications improved, markets established at strategic locations while education introduced by Christian missionaries enlightened the people. The power and functions of the chiefs and headmen had been redefined by the Chin Hills Regulation of 1896. Villages were regrouped. Inter-village and intra-village raids almost disappeared and the practice of slave-raiding was checked heavily. Though the British had gained the loyalty of some Chin Chiefs not all chiefs or headmen had reconciled themselves to British rule. Moreover, they looked suspiciously upon the progress of Christianity, the very reason for the popularity of Pau Cin Hau movement or Laipianism.
At the outbreak of the Great War there was a call for men from the hill areas of Assam and Burma for the Labour Corps in France. One thousand men each were to be supplied from the three subdivisions of Haka, Falam and Tedim. Hau Cin Khup, the Kamhau Chief, who had always been loyal to the British since the Sukte-Sihzang rebellion gave invaluable service by collecting more than a thousand from Tedim subdivision. He was assisted by chiefs Pau Za Cin, Dong Tual and Pau Khaw Mang in raising the Chin Labour Corps. The Superintendent of the Chin Hills had happily noted: “This response by the Northern Chin is more remarkable when it is considered that there are only about 5,000 males between the ages of 20 and 40 in the subdivision.”[2] In Falam subdivision over 800 labourers had been enrolled. There was minor resistance from the Khuangli village, which spread to a certain number of villages in the Zahau tract. But this was soon overcome.[3] Several Chin chiefs had also shown their loyalty to the British by making donations to the War Relief Fund. Among these Zahau Chief Van Nul and Falam Chief Van Hmon donated Rs.1000 and Rs.744 each.[4]
The situation in Haka subdivision was different. Laura Carson thus describes what it was:
word came that the Government was going to attempt to raise “a coolie corps” from among our people, for service in France. This caused great excitement. One corps had already been raised among the Siyins in Tiddim and efforts were being made to raise another in the Falam subdivision. Haka would be next! All military British officers and sepoys who could be spared had been withdrawn from the Hills and had gone to France. Civil officers were sent to lower Burma for military training. Haka was therefore left without a British officer and with only a handful of sepoys, most of whom were more boys, no one dreaming that the Haka Chins would make any serious trouble. But there was an undercurrent of tense excitement. One could feel it in the air. There were only three English-speaking people in Haka at the time, two Anglo-Indian men and myself. There was a rumor of trouble and attempted revolt in Falam and our Haka civil officer was hastily recalled from lower Burma, and the sepoy guard for Haka was increased from twenty-six to fifty men.[5]
In 1917, B Fisher, the Assistant Superintendent of Haka, met various chiefs of Haka subdivision and told them of the number of men each had to supply in proportion to the number of villages they held. It was this demand that was officially cited as the cause of the outbreak. Laura Carson who had over the years established a close rapport with the Haka people received the earliest intelligence of impending trouble on the evening of November 1917 from a Christian convert named Shia Kaw:
thirteen village had united, taking the sacred oath that they would attack Haka, kill the sepoys, take their guns and with them clear the Hills of the British and resume their own government…the men of Sakta had secreted their women and children in the jungle and carried out six months’ provision for them, and they were spending their time day and night making ammunition, and wait for an opportunity to strike. [6]
The Assistant Superintendent who had the matter investigated found Laura Carson’s fears unfounded. Two days later, however, Tsan Dwe, a Christian young man who belonged to an important chief’s family, brought another warning that “his brother had seen a large force congregated that evening only about three miles from Haka”. Another investigation was conducted by the Assistant Superintendent which proved that whatever Shia Kaw said turned out to be true. On the morning of 23 November 1917, after he received another report of an advancing army of 5,000 strong towards Haka, Fischer ordered all his men to take shelter in the “Police Lines”.[7] This was reported to the Superintendent of Falam who urgently wired Shillong for assistance.[8] The petty officials and the Mission workers including Laura Hardin were ordered to take shelter in the Police Lines where they remained for the next twenty-two days.
The next morning a reconnoitering party of fifteen mounted sepoys was ambushed near the station. Sporadic firing was heard though from a distance. The following day Chins were seen rushing into the compound and there was a sharp exchange of firing in which the sergeant’s wife and his daughter were killed.
The Falam-Haka road was cut off, huge trees had been felled across the road on the mountainsides, entanglements had been made out of the telegraph wire and stockades had been raised from the materials taken from Pioneer Camp buildings. On 12 December the Assistant Superintendent managed to clear the road for about twelve miles after thirteen hours of hard work, to enable a Relief Column from Kalewa.[9]
Meanwhile sporadic fighting had been going on at Zokhua, Khuapi, Aitung, Surkhua, Hnaring, and Sakta. On 16 December a 350 well armed Relief Column under the command of Major L E L Burne and four other British officers, and accompanied by the Superintendent at Falam, reached Haka. Contingents from the Assam Rifles sent from Aizawl and Kohima had also arrived in and in collaboration with two Burma columns mounted operations against the principal villages of Kapi, Aiton, Surkhua, Naring, Sakta and suffering in the process many casualties, thirty to forty in number.[10] Units from the Assam Rifles also began operations against villages northeast of Tao range, meeting stiff resistance from Buankhua, Buanlun and Thantlang. In February 1918 a combined Assam Rifles and Burma Military Police detachment moved to Lennakot (Sialmong) in the Northern Chin hills and then to southern Manipur where the Thados also rose up against recruitment for the Labour Corps.[11] The uprising had even spread to Zonghing in Mindat in the Pakokku Hill Tract and to the southern Lushai Hills, covering the upper Boinu and to Wantu, Laitet and Ngaphai resulting in extensive operations.[12]
In early 1919 the uprising was suppressed and leaders were brought to trial. Sixty-one were sentenced.[13] Two Haka Faron men Za Nawl and Hreng Ol were sentenced to death for killing Tum Hngel and her step-daughter Sui Zing, and Ral Chum of Hniarlawn for murdering Asing, a Chinese caretaker at the Pioneer Camp bungalow. The first two hanged themselves in the Haka lockup before the sentence could be carried out.[14] The other leaders were imprisoned in Haka, Falam, Tedim, and Mingyan jails. Fourteen chiefs and others who were serving out their sentences in the Myingyan Jail were later deported to Taungyi and Lashio. Fines amounting to over Rs. 13,000 were levied on the villages participated in the uprising while punitive labour was imposed on some, to construct roads and an artificial lake near Haka, in lieu of imprisonment.[15]
Colonel Leslie Shakespear, the Deputy Inspector General of the Assam Rifles, who was involved in the punitive measures against the Thados in Manipur said that situation in the Chin hills was aggravated by attempts to check slavery, and led to the uprising. The Missionary Robert G Johnson gave a different version:
The causes of rebellion were resentment on the part of the non-Christian Chins against the British occupation of their territory, the perceived loss of power on the part of the Chiefs, and the strange new laws and customs that were moulding society in ways alarming to them. The immediate occasion was the formation of Chin coolie corps to go to France and the reduction of British military forces from Burma.[16]
Such contentions however do not explain why the uprising was confined to the Haka subdivision, and did not involve the Taisun, Sukte, Kamhau, Sihzang, and others who were similarly circumstanced. In fact the first ripples of the disturbances in Manipur in 1915 had been immediately felt in the Tedim area, but it was the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup, who kept “a firm hand on his youngmen”. Likewise, in the Falam subdivision the Taisun Chiefs Van Hmun, the Zahau Chief Van Nul and his son Thang Tin Lian were all loyal to the British: Their contribution to the War Fund and assistance in obtaining labour recruits has already been mentioned. The Superintendent had in fact recorded in his annual Administration Report that:
At the outbreak of the Haka trouble various offers of assistance were given by the Chiefs of Falam and Tiddim Subdivisions. Notably the Yahows under Tantin Lyen offered to send a band of 50 men with guns to operate with the Military Police whenever required.
Van Hmon the Falam Chief undertook the guarding of the Falam suspension bridge at a time when sepoys could not be spared for his duty. And the Laiyo tribe rendered great help by patrolling the line of the Pao river.[17]
Both the Tedim and Falam subdivisions had been under the influence of powerful Chiefs. In Tedim area the Kamhau Chief Hau Cin Khup, who had been so loyal to the Government,[18] exerted remarkable influence on other subordinate chiefs. This was not the case in the Haka subdivision, for here some of the more influential chief had only recently been alienated. In 1915 there was widespread damage to troops by rodents and caterpillars in Haka and Falam. The damage was particularly severe in Haka, where three hundred and forty thousand rats were ultimately killed by the people. Shortage of food, and even starvation was reported from here, and that year the usual supply of foodgrain to the Military Police, which earned the Haka Chins considerable profits, became well nigh impossible. A consequence of this was that the chiefs could not pay their dues to the Government and in the following year they forfeited their commission. It was at this stage that orders came for the supply of men for the Labour Corps. Laura Carson thus records the reaction of the chiefs to the order:
The Government orders were that no coercion was to be used; but the chief did not understand that. An order to bring in the men meant that they must bring them. Chief after chief came to me and asked what he should do. They said that their people absolutely refused to go to France; that they said they had no quarrel with Germany and why should they go and fight the Germans? They said they would commit suicide rather than go.[19]
Undoubtedly the recruitment for the Labour Corps and reduction of British troops and officials from the hills which left the entire Chin hills insufficiently guarded were strong inducements.[20]
The months immediately following the suppression of the uprising were full of hardships for the Haka people. In the operations several villages had been burned with large quantities of grain. Punitive labour took the men away from the villages and the result was a terrible shortage of food, and almost famine conditions prevailed. “One of the leading chiefs told me”, Carson wrote, “that for two months he had not had any food whatever except ‘banhtaw’ which is the boiled sprouts of the banana tree. He said there were thousands in the same condition”.[21]
One of the most important reasons for the suppression of the uprising was the non-participation of the northern Chins who showed loyalty to the British. Had the entire Chin tribes fought in unison it would probably have had a different result? Contrary, the fighting was confined to Haka and its adjoining villages which gave the British army ample space to suppress it. Nevertheless, the causes and nature of the revolt undoubtedly revealed that it was an outburst of anger and a culmination of discontentment against the British administration. Thus it would not be wrong to say that the common cause of the Chin people had found its expression in the Haka uprising.
*It was one of the few Government buildings with a trench around it where sepoys were placed with guns. The best building in the Lines was the station Hospital- a brick building with a small office room, a tiny medicine room and two-fair-sized wards.
[1] Laura Hardin Carson, Pioneer Trails, Trials and Triumphs, Calcutta 1927, Reprint Aizawl 1997, p.233
[2] J W Wright, Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1916-17
[3] Ibid, 1917-18
[4] Ibid, for the year ended 30 June 1915
[5] Laura Carson, op.cit. p.226
[6] Ibid, pp.227-228 The next afternoon Shia Kaw came in again saying that forces were collecting again, both north and south of us, and that Haka was to be attacked within the next three or four days. I told him that the Assistant Superintendent said he had investigated and found conditions in Sakta normal; that women and children had not been taken way; that the people were loyal and that at least ninety were ready to go to France, and that there would be no insurrection. He was greatly excited and distressed and begged us to heed the warning which he had risked his life to bring. That night the Christians asked permission to sleep in the Mission Hospital and Mr. Cope and the teachers patrolled the Mission property all night- but there was not disturbance.
[7] Ibid pp.227-230
[8] Colonel L W Shakespear Assam Rifles, Calcutta 1929, p.212; In early December 1917 the D I G Assam Rifles received a wire from the Superintendent Chin Hills inquiring if he had any knowledge of likely trouble on the Chin Lushai border. The reply stated he had no such knowledge, the only minor trouble known of concerned Zongling in the Unadministered Area towards Arakan. Twelve hours later came an urgent wire to Shillong from Falam, the headquarters station in the Chin hills, saying the southern Chins had risen, Haka station was surrounded, and begging for urgent assistance. Permission to act having been obtained, D I G sent orders to Captain Falkland, Commandant 1st A R at Aijal, to march at once with 150 rifles for Haka, and in a few hours they were en route to cover the 16 marches as rapidly as possible. A few days later another urgent wire from Falam called for more help, and as active trouble had not as yet started in Manipur, Captain Montifore with 150 rifles of the 3rd A R at Kohima was ordered to the Chin hills, traveling as expeditiously as possible- by rail to Chittagong, river steamer to Rangamatti, country boats to Demagiri, whence onwards a fortnight’s hard marching to Haka.
[9] Robert G Johnson, History of the American Baptist Mission, Vol. 1, Valley Forge, USA, 1988, p.416
[10] B Fischer the Superintendent of Pakokku Hill Tracts reported that on 16 April 1918 a party consisting of Captain Alexander Assistant Commandant, a small escort and himself visited a group of villages known as Chan-im in order to calm the people who were very restless. They were attacked by the Chins killing one Miitary Police Havildar and wounding Alexander and two others.
[11] For details on the Kuki uprising in Manipur see L W Shakespear, op.cit. pp.209-232; Gautam Bhadra “The Kuki (?) Uprising (1917-11919): Its causes and nature”, Man in India Vol 55 No.1-4 (January-March) 1975, pp.11-56; Khaikhotinthang Kipgen, Thado War (1917019) Kuki (?) Rebellion, published by the author, Imphal 1976.
[12] For an account of the “Kuki Punitive measures”, in Manipur, L W Shakespear, op.cit. p.228; Robert Reid, op.cit.pp.79-89
[13] Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1918-1919; Some of the most important Haka chiefs responsible for the trouble and sentenced under section 121 of the Indian Penal Code were: Lyen Mo son of Za Err, Van Mang son of Lyen Mo, Kin Hmon son of Lyen Mo, Tyer Non wife of Van Mang, Kup Hmin son of Lwe Sang, Tat Hmon son of Ya Klwe, Ni Kwel son of Kuk Hre, Tan Hnyer son of Lyen Kwe
[14] Ibid, 1919-1920
[15] Johnson, pp.423-424 also see Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1919-1920
[16] Ibid, pp.409-410
[17] J M Wright Report on the Administration of the Chin Hills for the year 1917-18
[18] Chief Hau Cin Khup had won the following awards for his loyalty to the British: Silvermounted Da and a Certificate of Honour in 1901; K S M in 1917; a gun and a Certificate of Honour in 1918; a revolver and a Certificate of Honour in 1919. See Acts and Achievements of Hau Cin Khup, Chief of Kamhau Clan, Chin Hills, Tedim, Mandalay, Burma 1927.
[19] Laura Carson op.cit. p. 227
[20] E O Fowler commanded the 61st and 62nd Chin Labour Corps from the Tedim Subdivision to France. Altogether there were 1033 Chins from Tedim Subdivision consisting of 250 from Sukte tract, 700 from Kamhau tract and 83 from Sihzang tract. They left Tedim on 27 May 1917 and returned to the Chin Hills in the middle of 1918 with fifty-six casualties. The Labour Corps from Falam composed a part of the 78th Labour Company. They were accompanied by the young Lomban Chief Hlurr Hmung.
[21] Laura Carson, Ibid, p.238
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